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In the summer of 2020, mitigation efforts slowed the first US wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Experts warned, however, that without coordinated, sustained mitigation—such as testing and 
tracing, limited travel or gatherings, social distancing and mask wearing—the worst could lie 
ahead. A July survey found majority (59%) agreement with the expert warnings, while a 
minority (27%) mistakenly thought that the worst was behind us, or that COVID-19 was not a 
real problem. Among frequent Fox News and conservative talk radio consumers, however, large 
majorities (67–80%) held such false optimism or denial views, in contrast with small minorities 
(9–16%) among public radio and local television audiences. The impacts of news media choice 
were strongest among Republicans. Republicans who frequently watched Fox News were 
significantly more likely to express false optimism/denial views, whereas Republicans who 
watched a local TV station (ABC affiliate) or listened to public radio were significantly less 
likely to express false optimism/denial. News media choices had weaker effects on political 
Independents, however, and almost no effects on Democrats. These news media × party 
interactions suggest political asymmetry in the importance of “elite cues” for shaping COVID-19 
perceptions. Unrealistic perceptions had real consequences: false optimism and denial correlate 





The first US case of COVID-19 was confirmed in January 2020; by late March the rate of 
infection reached tens of thousands per day. Infections peaked above 30,000 cases and 2,000 
deaths per day in April, before mitigation efforts including stay-at-home policies slowed down 
this first wave. By late July, during the survey described in this paper, there had been 160,000 
confirmed deaths nationwide. The rate of new fatalities remained below its spring peak, but 
infections were rising again. Epidemiologists warned that without mitigation on a much larger 
scale, there was nothing to prevent worse outcomes in the seasons ahead. Coordinated mitigation 
efforts did not happen, and the warnings came true. In winter 2020/2021, daily hospitalizations 
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and deaths far exceeded their spring 2020 peak (Figure 1), and more than half a million 
Americans had died. 
 
 
Figure 1: Daily U.S. COVID-19 deaths and hospitalization (7-day averages) from March 1 2020 to March 
29 2021. Vertical lines enclose dates of our July 2020 survey. COVID data: Roser et al. (2020). 
 
Our survey took place from July 16 to 28, in the US state of New Hampshire. During this period, 
the state was experiencing comparatively mild impacts, averaging around 30 new cases and one 
death per day. As elsewhere, things subsequently worsened: in January the 7-day averages 
passed 700 new cases and 10 deaths per day. One question on the July survey had invited 
respondents to look forward: Did they think that for the US, the worst of the pandemic was yet to 
come? Or that the worst was behind us, or even that COVID-19 was not really a major problem? 
In hindsight, as in scientifically-informed opinion at the time, the latter two views reflect false 
optimism at best, or simply denial. They contributed to the disaster by implying less need for 
prevention, whether policy or individual behavior. 
 
What were the social bases of false optimism? Aside from its demographic patterns, what can we 
say about the role of information sources in supporting (or countering) inaccurate perceptions 
that the pandemic was waning or unreal, so preventive steps were not urgent? The July survey 
sheds light on these questions. 
 
 
Data and Methods 
 
Our summer 2020 survey was part of a series examining coronavirus-related beliefs and behavior 
(Hamilton & Safford 2020b, 2020c, 2021; Safford & Hamilton 2020). Background and citations 
to related studies appear in previous articles on public trust in scientists regarding vaccines 
(Hamilton et al. 2015), the Zika virus pandemic (Hamilton & Safford 2020a; Safford et al. 2017), 
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and topics such as climate change (Hamilton 2015; Safford et al. 2020). Other studies give 
evidence that on science-related issues, New Hampshire surveys approximate US nationwide 
responses (e.g., Hamilton et al. 2019). 
 
Sampling for this online survey employed the University of New Hampshire Survey Center’s 
Granite State Panel, composed of residents recruited randomly from phone numbers across the 
state. A total of 959 people responded to the July 2020 survey. Weights adjusting for 
representativeness in terms of age, gender, education, political party and region have been 
applied to all analyses in this article. 
 
Variables analyzed here are listed in Table 1, with response summaries and codes for regression. 
Independent variables include age, gender, education and political party, along with how 
frequently respondents watched or listened to four news sources: Fox News, conservative talk 
radio, a local TV station (WMUR, an ABC affiliate), or New Hampshire public radio (NHPR). 
 
Figure 2 charts responses to our dependent variable, the behind us question. Although 59% 
agreed with expert warnings that the worst of the pandemic was yet to come, 21% took a more 
sanguine view that the worst was behind us, while 6% maintained that COVID-19 had not been a 
real problem. The latter two views proved badly mistaken. Combing the two responses defines a 
{0,1} indicator of false optimism or denial (27%). 
 




Age — 19 to 91 years, mean 49 
Gender — male (0, 48%), female (1, 52%) 
Education— high school or less (1, 34%), technical school/some college (2, 33%), college 
graduate (3, 21%), postgraduate (4, 12%) 
Party — Democrat (48%), Independent (10%), Republican (42%) each coded as a 0/1 dummy 
variable 
Fox News — watch never/DK (0, 58%), occasionally (1, 24%), frequently (2, 18%) 
Conservative talk radio — listen never/DK (0, 74%), occasionally (1, 17%), frequently (2, 9%) 
Local TV (WMUR, an ABC affiliate) — watch never/DK (0, 21%), occasionally (1, 38%), 
frequently (2, 41%) 
Public radio (NHPR) — listen never/DK (0, 45%), occasionally (1, 33%), frequently (2, 22%) 
 
Dependent Variable 
Behind us — Which statement do you think is more accurate concerning the coronavirus of 
COVID-19 in the United States? 
 The worst is yet to come (0, 59%) 
 The worst is behind us (1, 21%) 
 COVID-19 has not really been a major problem in the US (1, 6%) 












Figure 3 breaks down the percentage of false-optimism responses (behind us = 1) by respondent 
characteristics and media choices. Differences between age groups, men and women, or by 
education appear small compared with the 50-point gap separating Republicans (54% false 
optimism) from Democrats (4% false optimism). Independents (22%) stand closer to Democrats. 
Even wider gaps separate those who frequently (67%) or never (10%) watch Fox News, and 
frequently (80%) or never (13%) listen to conservative talk radio. Significant differences occur 
in the opposite direction among local TV watchers and public radio listeners. These news-media 
effects reflect information conveyed by each source—often downplaying the seriousness of the 
pandemic (in line with President Trump’s pronouncements) on Fox News and conservative talk 
radio, contrasting with more attention to infectious-disease expert perspectives on local TV and 
public radio. Recent studies explore the resulting impacts of conservative media on coronavirus 
conspiracy beliefs (Jamieson & Albarracin 2020), preventive behavior (Simonov et al. 2020) and 





Figure 3:  Percentages saying the worst is behind us or COVID-19 is not really a major problem 
(overall, 27%) by respondent characteristics and news media choices. Probabilities from design-
based F tests. 
 
Political identity is known to influence news media choices (e.g., Bolin & Hamilton 2018), so 
relationships in Figures 3e–h might be spurious. Media/party associations also raise the question 
of whether media effects might be different across parties. A multivariate analysis summarized in 
Table 2 tests these possibilities by entering all four media items, together with media × party 
interactions, age, gender and education, into a logit regression model predicting the odds of a 
false optimism/denial response (behind us = 1). Older respondents are less inclined to false 
optimism/denial (p = 0.028), but otherwise Republican identity and media × Republican 
interactions dominate these results. The significant main effect for Republican (p < 0.0005) 
indicates that, even among respondents who say they never watch or listen to any of the four 
listed news sources, Republicans are more inclined toward false optimism/denial. Non-
significant main effects for each of the four media items mean that news media choices had little 
effect on perceptions among Democrats, the base or reference category of party. 
 
Turning to interactions, the positive Fox News × Republican coefficient (p = 0.010) tells us that 
among Republicans, more frequent Fox viewership is associated with higher probabilities of 
false optimism/denial, as visualized in Figure 4a. Conversely, the negative local TV × 
Republican (p = 0.012) and public radio × Republican (p = 0.008) coefficients indicate that 
Republicans who attended to those news sources were less inclined toward false optimism/denial 
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(Figures 4c and 4d). News media choices show no significant effects among Democrats or 
Independents. 
 
Table 2: Weighted logit regression of response that worst is behind us or COVID-19 is not a real problem 
(behind us = 1) on respondent age, gender, education, political party and frequency of news media 
consumption, with news × party interactions. Showing coefficients, linearized standard errors, t-test 
probabilities, and 95% confidence intervals. Colors denote statistically significant positive (blue, more 
false optimism) or negative (red, less false optimism) effects; estimation sample n = 899. 
 
Predictor  Coefficient SE  p  ci lower ci upper 
 
Age (years)  –0.025  0.011  0.028  –0.048  –0.003 
Gender (F)  0.050  0.363  0.890  –0.662  0.762   
Education  0.246  0.188  0.192  –0.124  0.615 
Party 
     Democrat (base) ….  ….  ….  ….  ….  
     Independent  2.386  1.226  0.052  –0.019  4.792 
     Republican  4.408  0.851  0.000  2.739  6.078 
Fox News  –0.264  0.506  0.602  –1.257  0.729  
Fox News × party 
     Democrat (base) ….  ….  ….  ….  ….  
     Independent  –0.069  0.866  0.936  –1.769  1.631 
     Republican  1.453  0.564  0.010  0.346  2.561 
Talk radio  0.879  0.725  0.226  –0.544  2.303 
Talk radio × party 
     Democrat (base) ….  ….  ….  ….  ….         
     Independent  –0.633  1.154  0.583  –2.898  1.631 
     Republican  –0.104  0.785  0.894  –1.646  1.437  
Local TV  0.731  0.447  0.102  –0.146  1.608 
Local TV × party 
     Democrat (base) ….  ….  ….  ….  …. 
     Independent  –0.397  0.805  0.622  –1.977  1.183 
     Republican  –1.591  0.633  0.012  –2.833  –0.349 
Public radio  0.374  0.389  0.337  –0.390  1.139 
Public radio × party 
     Democrat (base) ….  ….  ….  ….  ….      
     Independent  0.394  0.617  0.523  –0.818  1.606 
     Republican  –1.443  0.540  0.008  –2.502  –0.384 
 
Constant  –3.966  0.774  0.000  –5.485  –2.447 





Figure 4:  Visualizing news media × party interaction effects: adjusted margins plots based on 





Associations between partisan identity, news media preferences and perceptions are well known 
for many topics, including climate change as well as COVID-19. Our analysis of 2020 survey 
data adds a new element: evidence that media choices affected Republican COVID-19 
perceptions more than they did for other political groups. Elite cues from co-partisan political or 
media leaders tend to disproportionately influence conservatives (Bullock 2011; Carmichael et 
al. 2017; Hamilton & Safford 2021). In this new COVID-19 analysis, it appears that elite cues 
from sources that are not co-partisan may disproportionately affect conservatives as well. For 
Republicans in particular, attending to local TV news and public radio supported realism; 
attending to Fox News and conservative talk radio did the opposite, implying less need for 
prevention.  
 
Our survey’s behind us indicator has tetrachoric correlations of –0.72 with mask wearing, –0.67 
with concern that the respondent or their family might become sick, and –0.85 with prioritizing 
government efforts to control the virus. Through such connections to behavioral and policy 





Support for coronavirus questions on Granite State Panel surveys was provided by the Carsey 
School of Public Policy and the College of Liberal Arts at the University of New Hampshire. 
The Granite State Panel is conducted by the UNH Survey Center. Any opinions, findings, and 
conclusions or recommendations expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not 
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